So, I just finished this essay for a university philosophy class on morality, figured I’d chuck it up here to see what you guys think. I realize this is a necropost, but the search function pulled through once again. Anyways, here’s my essay, I can maybe link to the original articles if you guys want. It brings up some interesting points:
In this essay, I will be examining two articles in regards to the morality of abortion. The articles are “Abortion and Infanticide” by Michael Tooley, and “Why Abortion is Immoral” by Don Marquis. I will then analyze their statements using the tools I have learned in class, and then form a critical response argument revealing my own moral opinion.
Tooley’s argument is predicated on the idea that in order for a person to have a right to live, it must have the desire to live. If the organism doesn’t possess the desire to continue life, then it does not have a right to live. Tooley argues that an unborn fetus doesn’t possess the mental faculties to desire life and it does not feel the need for self-preservation. Furthermore, Tooley argues that a fetus is not in a fact a person at all. It then follows that it is not seriously wrong to terminate an unborn fetus since it does not have the right to live. In his words, “an organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.” (Tooley, p. 44)
Essentially, what Tooley suggests is that an organism must understand what life is, that it is a collection of experiences and thoughts and ambitions, and that it must wish to partake in these experiences in order for it to have a serious right to life. If A has a desire for X, then others have a moral obligation to refrain from actions that would deprive him/her from their desires. In this case, that desire is life. Since fetuses are incapable of being self-aware in this fashion, they have to desire for continuity, and therefore, they have no serious right to life and morally may be terminated.
Tooley spends a great deal of his time classifying exactly what makes a human being a human being, in order to support his argument. He first clarifies what is meant by “person” as opposed to “human being”. The term human being, he finds, is a poor choice of words. If the moral question of abortion is based on whether or not a fetus is a human being, then the argument between pro-choice and pro-life factions comes down to a disagreement of factual properties that a fetus possesses. It is a disagreement about facts. On the other hand, if the term ‘person’ is used, philosophers are less likely to call it a factual disagreement. The disagreement may be about what properties a thing must have to be a person, or about whether a fetus at a specific stage in development possesses these properties; a moral question.
The main question that Tooley poses is this: When is a member of the species homo sapiens (human beings) a person? What properties must a thing have to have a serious right to life? At what point in the development of a human being does it possess the properties to make it a person? (Tooley, p. 43) Tooley’s entire argument is centered around these simple questions.
Tooley goes on to further clarify what is meant by a “right to life”. He says that the phrase “right to life” is misleading since it suggests that the right in question concerns the continued existence of a biological organism. He argues that this is not the case. Consider an adult human brain in the future. This adult human brain contains memories, experiences, and other mental states that are unique to that person. If perhaps, this brain could be reprogrammed so that it had different apparent memories, experience, personality traits, and other mental states, it could be argued that the previous set of experiences had been destroyed, and that the person who had those memories and experiences had ceased to be, and that their right to life had been violated. However, there was no harm to the biological body that encompasses that brain. Therefore, a right to life is the continued existence of experiences and memories that we are concerned about, not necessarily the physical aspect of the body.
Tooley then goes on to modify his original argument, stating “A is a subject of experiences and other mental states, A is capable of desiring to continue to exist as a subject of experiences and other mental states, and if A does desire to continue to exist as such an entity, then others are under a prima facie obligation not to prevent him from doing so.” (Tooley, p. 46)
The final addition to Tooley’s argument is defining what must be the case if something is to be capable of having a desire to continue to exist as a subject of experiences and other mental states. “The basic point here is that the desires a thing can have are limited by the concepts it possesses.” (Tooley, p. 46) He goes on to state that in order for a person to desire something, they have to understand what that thing is. If one is to wish that a certain thing be true, then one would have to understand it. And in order for one to understand something, it is necessary to possess the concepts involved in it. It follows that in order for one to wish something is true, it is limited by the concepts that one possesses. Applying this logic to the case of an entity that is the subject of experiences and other mental states, the conclusion drawn is that an entity cannot be the sort of thing that can desire that a subject of experiences and other mental states exist unless is possesses the concept of such a subject. In addition, said entity cannot desire that it itself continue existing as a subject of these experiences and other metal states unless it believes that it is currently such a subject. “This completes the justification of the claim that it is a necessary condition of something’s having a serious right to life that is possess the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences, and that it believe that it itself is such an entity.” (Tooley, p. 47)
Marquis, on the other hand, presents a very different argument. Marquis bases his argument on a very fundamental element of human morality: Is it wrong to kill us? Marquis and Tooley, as well as the vast majority of the human race, agree that killing an adult human being is seriously morally wrong. However, Marquis takes this a step further and applies an account of when it is wrong to kill to unborn fetuses. The question does not become whether or not the fetus is human, but whether or not terminating a fetus will result in the loss of a valuable future of a human being. Marquis argues that what makes killing wrong is the effect that it has on the victim, which I’m sure we can all agree on. He suggests that killing is wrong because it denies the experiences, projects, and enjoyment that would have otherwise constituted a human being’s valuable future. (Marquis, p. 190)
When someone is killed, they lose all of their experiences and values that they gained through their life, and they also lose the experience and values that they would have otherwise attained later on in their lives. Marquis explains that this can be applied to infants and unborn fetuses. By terminating an unborn fetus, the future of that fetus is directly harmed. “The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong.” (Marquis, p. 192)
Marquis expands on his ‘futures-like-ours’ argument with several examples and theories that support this account of why it is wrong to kill human beings. The basis of his argument is the idea of that an unborn fetus potentially has the same future as an adult human being. Typically, a fetus develops into a baby, which is born, grows, and becomes an adult human being, no different from you and me.
Marquis goes on to analyze his own argument. The point of his analysis is to find out what natural property ultimately explains the wrongness of killing, given that it is wrong. The analysis rests on the intuition that what makes killing a particular human of animal is what it does to that particular human or animal. The claim that what makes killing wrong is directly supported by two considerations, which Marquis lays out for us.
This theory explains why killing is considered the worst of all crimes. Since it deprives the victim of more than any other crime, killing is especially wrong. As well, it explains why people with terminal illnesses such as cancer or AIDS feel that this is bad for them. AIDS and cancer will cause a premature death, and they will lose their future, which is obviously of value to them. They believe it is a bad thing for them to die, because they will not get the future that they would have otherwise experienced had the illness not caused an early death. (Marquis, p. 190)
Upon examining the idea that what makes killing wrong is the loss to the victim the value of the victim’s future, there are even more supporting arguments for this claim. When looking at a few of the implications, this becomes clear. Take, for example, the view that it is wrong to kill only beings who are biologically human. What if, perhaps, there was a species that lived on a different planet that had futures similar to ours? Surely it would be wrong to kill them as well, wouldn’t it? Marquis’ future-like-ours theory explains this. The future of a different species would have the same moral worth as our own future, and thus, it would be wrong to kill them as well. (Marquis, p. 191)
Marquis presents a few more merits for his argument, such as the fact that the claim that the loss of one’s future is the thing that makes killing wrong does not mean that active euthanasia is wrong as well. If a person is seriously ill, and has no future except that of pain and suffering, one could say that they would not value that future very much. If they are killed, they do not suffer a loss of a valuable future, and therefore, it is not seriously morally wrong. Of course, Marquis states that there may be other reasons which would make active euthanasia wrong, but naturally he does not go into depth, seeing as euthanasia is not the topic of this essay, and it is irrelevant to the morality of abortion.
The last statement Marquis gives for his argument is that it very straightforwardly applies to children and infants. Since killing an infant or child would directly destroy the value of their future, it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill an infant or child. Since this reason is sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill adults, children, and infants, it is also sufficient to explain why the termination of an unborn fetus is wrong as well.
In both of the essays presented by the authors, they acknowledge the struggle between pro-life and pro-choice philosophers. There can be no in between, there is only the extreme. The morality of abortion seems to be a never ending tug-of-war between the two sides, and neither can muster up a strong enough argument to topple the defense of the opposing group. Tooley and Marquis both present very interesting arguments.
In Tooley’s case, he takes a decidedly Kantian approach. He talks of the desires and values. Kant’s theory was that people had desires, and therefore anything that fulfilled those desires was of value to that particular person. In the case of the abortion, that desire is life. By explaining the right to live as the desire to continue as a self-aware entity that understands what life is and wishes to continue being alive, Tooley defines what it truly means to live and applies this to unborn fetuses. A fetus cannot ‘wish’ that it were alive, because it does not know what it is to be alive. Therefore, if it cannot wish to be alive, it does not have a serious right to live, and can morally be terminated, or aborted.
However, this theory does not address the problem of an adult person in a coma. Say, perhaps, that an adult was in a coma for 30 days. At the end of those thirty days, that person was glad that they were able to continue living. However, while in a coma, the person was incapable of desiring life. According to Tooley’s theory, it would have been morally acceptable to end that person’s life while they were in a coma.
Marquis, on the other hand, takes a more consequentialist and utilitarian view, basing his argument on the value of a future like ours. He argues that it is wrong to kill a fetus because it would be depriving it of a valuable future that it would have had. This argument is very well formed, and seems to address some situations that Tooley’s theory cannot explain. For example, consider the person in the coma. While the person is in the coma, their future can be of value to the family around them. Even though the person himself may not value his own future anymore, others can see the value and therefore it would be wrong to kill the patient in the coma. It also applies to people wanting to commit suicide. They may not see the value in their future, even though it may still exist. Others can see the value in their future, even tremendous value in some cases. Therefore, it would be seriously morally wrong to commit suicide.
Another problem with Tooley’s claim that a person has a right to live only if they understand that they are alive and wish to continue living is that this doesn’t apply in other situations. Say a patient needs to undergo a complex operation to save his life. Without this operation, he would surely die. Although the man doesn’t understand everything about the operation, he still has the right to receive it. According to Tooley, the man would need to learn all the specific details of his operation and fully understand it in order for him to have a right to get the operation. Perhaps this man is in a coma, and doesn’t possess the ability to comprehend the procedure and consent to it. Tooley seems to claim that this patient cannot get the life saving operation that he obviously needs. Furthermore, it would be morally ‘okay’ to let this patient die, since they weren’t conscious enough to desire to continue existing.
Marquis’ approach to this problem directly addresses it in a straightforward way. Since the man values his future, and those around him value his future as well, the surgeon ought to carry out the procedure so that the man can continue to live and continue to gain experiences and memories. He has a right to continue living, even though he is conscious, and doesn’t technically fulfill the definition of ‘person’ that Tooley has so painstakingly laid out. The man needn’t be conscious to have a right to get the operation, and he doesn’t even need to understand what the procedure is about in order to get it. Tooley’s argument just does not address this situation.
One more issue with Tooley’s claims is how we know that a human being is developed enough and possess the properties that make it a person. At what stage in development does the baby become self aware and understand what it is? When can it decide for itself whether or not it wants to live? In order for Tooley’s claim to work, there must be a specific point from which a fetus crosses the threshold and becomes a person.
One of the reasons this is made so difficult is that we simply cannot communicate with babies until they progress enough to use words and speak to us. How are we to know that the baby wishes to live? How can anyone be sure just exactly what is going through a baby’s mind? There is absolutely no way to conclusively prove whether a baby realizes that it is alive, and that it is subject to experiences and other mental states, and that it indeed wishes to continue to being such an entity. Who is to say that a baby doesn’t in fact understand this concept in their own way? It need not be in the form of intelligent words that you and I would understand, yet it could still be that a baby wishes to live and has a right to live. According to Tooley, it would not.
What if you were to come across the rare case of an adult person that truly did not understand what it was to be alive, and they did not consciously wish to continue living, they just simply did it because they know nothing else? Would it be seriously morally wrong to kill this person? Tooley seems to think it would not, while Marquis would argue that the person potentially had great value in their future, whether they knew it or not. To a degree, this can be said of one who is mentally handicapped as well. They may not understand the concept of being alive, and they may not explicitly wish to continue living, but sure they must not want to die. This is a form of the alternate account stated by Marquis called ‘discontinuation’, which states that it would be wrong to kill a person not if they wished for their life not to be discontinued. (Marquis, p. 195)
Another problem with Tooley’s claim is stated by Marquis himself. “One problem with the desire account is that we do regard it as seriously wrong to kill persons who have little desire to live or who have no desire to live or, indeed, have a desire not t live. We believe it is seriously wrong to kill the unconscious, the sleeping, those who are tired of life, and those who are suicidal. The value-of-a-human-future account renders standard morality intelligible in these cases.” (Marquis, p. 196) Tooley’s definition of the right to live does not account for these cases whatsoever.
I strongly agree with Marquis in terms of the future-like-ours claim. Indeed, if asked, I would argue that by destroying a human fetus, one would be directly responsible for the absence of a human being some 9 months in the future. Had that fetus been given the opportunity, it would typically have developed into a baby, a child, and later a functional adult member of the home sapiens species. I would argue that a fetus does not have to be conscious to have a right to live. Indeed, on a very basic level, does it not exhibit the desire to live simply by developing? What reason does a fetus have for growing and progressing towards life? It is coded instinct in the very cells that make up the fetus. The very basis of life is self preservation, and as cells grow and multiply, they constitute life itself. Although it cannot be written down in the form of intelligent language, or even depicted in an image, a cell certainly desires to live otherwise it would cease to function. Life is the driving purpose behind organic beings, because without life there is nothing.
I would argue that it matters not whether the collection of cells is sentient, or even if we can comprehend what drives them towards growth. What matters is the ends that they achieve. Eventually through the work of the cells, a baby is born, just the same as you and I were at one point in our lives. It goes through the same stages of development as us, it requires energy to sustain itself, and it will eventually have a future worth valuing like us. Therefore, it should follow that a fetus is a person just like us, and it would be seriously morally wrong to kill it.
Certainly Marquis has come very close to what it means to live. Tooley’s claim is well formed and meticulous, but can be invalidated with the use of counterexamples, and situations where it would be plain absurd. For example, if we live only because we desire to live, the pain of one’s death could be eliminated by a mere reconfiguration of one’s desires, which is absurd to say the least.
Marquis has a described an account that is well formed as well, but is philosophically broad enough that it can be applied to many situations and circumstances that Tooley’s cannot. Tooley is so thorough in his definition of what constitutes a person and whether or not they have a right to live, his claim is narrowed down to a specific set of circumstances and cannot be compatible in other cases.
After presenting my own arguments, I can safely conclude that I agree with Marquis’ claim that destroying the valued future of a human being is what makes killing wrong, and fetuses have valuable futures that are similar to our own, so it follows that destroying the future of an unborn fetus is seriously morally wrong.
